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THE ILLINOIS GUEST STATUTE:
JUDICIAL EXEMPTION OF INFANTS
ROSENBAUM v. RASKIN
The Illinois Supreme Court consolidated the two cases described below on appeal because the issues involved were basically the same: whether or not the Illinois "guest statute"' embraced children of "tender years"'2 as a matter of law. The court
held that the legislative intent was to exclude children of tender
years from the scope of the Illinois guest statute.
The first of these cases was Ragon v. Ragon,3 a suit originating in the Circuit Court of Fulton County, Illinois. Ross Ragon
was the owner and operator of a motor vehicle in which Charles
Ragon, his three year old nephew, was riding. The vehicle collided with another driven by the co-defendant Brock. The child
suffered severe physical injuries from which he later died.
The complaint contained two counts. The first alleged that
the owner and operator of the car in which the plaintiff was a
passenger committed certain negligent acts which proximately
caused the collision with Brock's vehicle and the resultant fatal
injuries to the Ragon infant. The second count attributed various acts of negligence to the co-defendant Brock. Defendant Ragon moved to dismiss the complaint as to him, alleging that recovery was barred by the Illinois guest statute, and the court
thereupon dismissed the first count. The plaintiff moved to vacate the court's dismissal of Ragon and in support of his position
filed an answer to the motion which attacked the guest statute as
being inapplicable to minors under seven years of age. Nevertheless, the motion to vacate was denied and the plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois, challenging the
statute's constitutionality as applied to minors of tender years.
I ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 951/2 §9-201, (1969).
Liability for bodily injury to or death of guest.

No person riding in or upon a motor vehicle or motorcycle as a guest

without payment for such ride, or while engaged in a joint enterprise

with the owner or driver of such motor vehicle or motorcycle, nor his
personal representative in the event of the death of such guest, shall
ave a cause of action for damages against the driver or operator of
such motor vehicle or motorcycle, or its owner or his employee or agent
for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall

have been caused by the wilful and wanton misconduct of the driver or
operator of such motor vehicle or motorcycle or its owner or his em-

ployee or agent and unless such wilful and wanton misconduct contributed to the injury, death or loss for which the action is brought.
Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to relieve a
motor vehicle or motorcycle carrier of passengers for hire of responsibility for injury or death sustained by any passenger for hire.
2 The term child of "tender years" is meant to refer to those children
under seven years of age. An "infant" is of the same age group.
3 45 Ill. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 100 (1970).
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Rosenbaum v. Raskin,4 the second of the cases, also involved
an injury to a child. Holly Ann Rosenbaum, four years of age.
was at the Raskins' home playing with their two children. Mrs.
Raskin, preparing to do some errands, told the children to get
into the car. The plaintiff and one of the Raskin children got
into the front seat, whereupon Mrs. Raskin asked the girls to get
into the back seat of the car. As the plaintiff backed out, she put
her left hand on the center post for support. While her hand was
sliding down the post Mrs. Raskin opened the rear door.- Plaintiff's finger was crushed between the post and the front edge of
the rear door.
The Rosenbaum case was not tried on a guest statute approach, but on simple tort negligence. The complaint, in part,
contained the following allegations: (1) that the defendants, -Mr.
and Mrs. Raskin, owned, operated, and controlled the standing
automobile, (2) that the plaintiff was a minor of four years:of
age seated in the car at the defendant's request and invitation,
and (3) that Mrs. Raskin had invited the plaintiff to enter the
car in order to have company for her own children.5 The only
wrongful conduct alleged was negligence in the operation of the
rear door and in the failure to- give warning that the door -was
being opened. No attempt was made by the defendants to establish the plaintiff's status as a guest 6 or passenger, and the defendants failed to deny the allegations of invitation.
When the defendant moved for a directed verdict at the end
of the plaintiff's evidence and at the end of all the evidence:,
the argument both times centered upon whether actual or
implied parental consent was present. 7 The defendant tendered an instruction setting up the guest statute as applicable law
and the trial court refused to allow it.8 The verdict and judgment were for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed to the
Illinois Appellate Court.
4 Id.
5 To determine a rider's status in a host-guest'question,, it is necessary
to inquire into -who is the person advantaged by the carriage. If it promotes
mutual interests or is primarily for the benefit of the operator, the passenger
is not a guest. Miller v. Miller, 395 Ill. 273, 69 N.E.2d 878 (1946).
16 The guest statute is. not an'affirmative defense which is necessary to
be pleaded. Fischer V,.Ross, 79 Ill. App. 2d 372, 223 N.E.2d 722 (1967).
7 The plaintiff was the niece'of the defendants. Both lived on the same
street about one-half block apart. The plaintiff frequently went to the
defendant's home to play with the young Raskin children nandon this occasion
plaintiff's mother called to find out if it would be all right for her daughter
to come over. It Was explained that the °defendants were planning to
leave early that 'afternoon. The defendants Alleged at the trial that
express consent was granted by the tdlephone conversation and implied
consent was granted by allowing the' defendants custody of the child in
addition
to consent in the past for other automobile trips.
'- 8 P-iresumably, the court's refusal was not based on the plaintiff'-infancy
but more likely-on tVie: fa ct 'thait a-hoguest relati nship had. not: deeloped:
9Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 103 Ill,' App."2d 469, 243,.-N.R.2d- 616,'(1968).
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On the appellate level9 the applicability of the guest statute
was again argued. The plaintiff cited several cases from foreign
jurisdictions which allowed recovery by infants, 10 the court attempted to distinguish them from the case at bar," and the defendant urged cases which disallowed recovery.12 The court then
held: (1) nothing in the Illinois statute indicated an intent to
exempt infants,'1 3 and (2) a child of four can be a guest within
the meaning of the statute if the child's parent actually or impliedly consented to that status. 4 Hence, the plaintiff could be a
guest and barred from recovery. The trial court's judgment for
plaintiff was reversed and the case remanded. This judgment
was then appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois which consolidated it with the Ragon case for opinion.
.The Supreme Court reviewed the two factual situations and
the contentions of the parties below, and recognized that the issue was of first impression in this state. The court alluded to the
summary of foreign jurisdictional approaches found in the appellate opinion of the Rosenbaum case and noted that a spectrum

of results had been reached dealing with guest statutes similar to
that of Illinois.' 5
10 Id. at 475-78, 243 N.E.2d at 619-20.
Plaintiff urged as support:
Rocha v. Hulen, '6 Cal. App. 2d 245, 44 P.2d 478 (1935) (an infant cannot
be a guest under California statutes, for without parent he cannot accept) ;
Green v. Jones, 136 Colo. 512, 319 P.2d 1083 (1957) (infant cannot accept
guest status); Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407, 31 N.E.2d 670 (1941)
(minor under seven [here six months of age] cannot exercise choice to become guest) ; Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396, 216 P.2d 262 (1950)
(same) ; Burhans v. Witbeck, 375 Mich. 253, 134 N.W.2d 225 (1965) (infant
under five not subject to guest statute) ; Lynott v. Sells, 52 Del. 385, 158 A.2d
583 (1958) (infant unable to become guest without parental consent).
11 Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 103 Ill. App. 2d 469, 243 N.E.2d 616 (1968).
The court distinguished each case forwarded by plaintiff. Rocha v. Hulen,
6 Cal. App. 2d 245, 44 P.2d 478 (1935): a subsequent case, Bruckner v.
Vetterick, 124 Cal. App. 2d 417, 269 P.2d 67 (1954) held infants had guest
status of mother whom they accompany; Green v. Jones, 136 Colo. 512, 319
P.2d 1085 (1957) : driver was mother's agent and hence not a "host"; Fuller
v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407, 31 N.E.2d 670 (1941): defendant's acts-were
not within the granted parental consent and instruction; Kudrna v. Adamski,
188 Ore. 396, 216 P.2d 262 (1950): driver was agent of another and thus
nota "host"; Burhans v. Witbeck, 375 Mich. 253, 134 N.W.2d 225 (1965):
perhaps not a host-guest relationship.
12 Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 103 Ill. App. 469, 477, 243 N.E.2d 616, 620
.(1968); Snelling v. Pieper, 178 Neb. 818, 135 N.W.2d 707 (1965) (minor
with parental consent may be guest)- Favatella v. Poulsen, 17 Utah 2d
24, 403 P.2d 918 (1965) (same); Baian v. Ogassin, 277 Mass. 525, 179
N.E. 232 (1931) (statute applicable when infant in full custody of another) ;
Morgan v. Anderson, '149 Kan. 814, 89 P.2d 866 (1939) (same) ; In re
Wright's Estate, 170 Kan. 600, 228 P.2d 911 (1951) (same) ; Whitfield v.
Bruegel, 134 Ind. App. 636, 190 N.E.2d 670 (1963) (implied consent brings
infant within statute).
'3 Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 103 Ill. App. 2d 469, 478, 243 N.E.2d 616, 620
(1968).

14 Id.

15 See generally, Letterel v. Cernigilia, 82 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1948) (eleven
yealold.:with: parents, a guest); Tilghman v. Rightor,.,211 Ark. 229,..199
S.W.2d 943 (1947) (seven,, nine, and'fomteen*_year old 'hitch-htkers"huil
to be guests) ; Hart v. Hogan, 173 Wash. 598, 24 P,2d. 9Q .(9,98)
(mother
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The intent of the Illinois guest statute was judicially explained as protection afforded to he who, "out of the generosity
of his heart, renders gratuitously some service to his fellow traveler."' 6 Practically speaking, the purpose has frequently been
stated to be protection for insurance companies against collusive
claims,'7 but courts have shown great concern that the purpose
of the statute not be perverted.' 8
There are clearly three approaches that may be taken to the
problem of the application of guest statutes to children of tender
years. The first, and strictest view, is that a child of tender
years, riding at the invitation of the host, is a guest and therefore incapable of recovering without a showing of wilful and
Secondly, there is the view that a child of
wanton misconduct.'
tender years may be a guest depending upon the presence of actual or implied parental consent. A survey of the case law will
indicate that this is actually the only approach to be found. 20 The
third possibility is that a child of tender years is not a guest as a
matter of law.
who had no alternative but to take twelve year old daughter with her for
business, not a guest); Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407, 31 N.E.2d 670
(1941) (six year old left in custody of another without consent for a ride,
not a guest; child incapable of assenting to invitation).
2d 25, 29-30, 257 N.E.2d 100, 102 (1970).
16 Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45 Ill.
The court quoted from Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564, 579, 52 N.E.2d 229
(1943) :
That there should be a difference between the liability of a person who,
out of the generosity of his heart, renders gratuitously some service to
his fellow traveler over those rendering such service for hire and barter,
can hardly be questioned. Those who are charitably inclined should not
be restrained by the fear of the consequences of their own charitable act
and the recipients should not be permitted to gain by the generosity of
their host. Undoubtedly the Legislature, in adopting this act, was aware
of the frequency of litigation in which passengers, carried gratuitously
in automobiles, have sought the recovery of large sums for injuries
alleged to have been due to negligent operation, and where, in the use
of automobiles, which is almost universal, generous drivers might find
themselves involved in litigation that often turned upon questions of
ordinary negligence. It was evidently the intention of the Legislature
not only to correct this abuse but to promote the best interests of the
people in their relation to each other. To that end, this court has so
applied the Illinois guest statute, ever mindful, however, that, being in
derogation of the common law, it is to be strictly construed.
Id. at 30, 257 N.E.2d at 10.
17 Truitt v. Gaines, 199 F. Supp. 143 (1961)
(Delaware law); Rogers
v. Lawrence, 227 Ark. 117, 296 S.W.2d 899 (1956); Stephan v. Proctor,
45 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1965); Ehrsam v. Borgen, 185 Kan. 776, 347 P.2d 260
(1959); Dym v. Gordon, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792
(1965); Naphtali v. Lafazan, 186 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1959); Schlim v. Gau,
80 S.D. 403, 125 N.W.2d 174 (1963); Houston Belt v. Burmester, 309 S.W.2d
271 (Tex. 1957).
IsTruitt v. Gaines, 199 F.Supp. 143 (1961) (Delaware law); Colombo
v. Sech, 52 Del. 575, 163 A.2d 270 (1960) ; Ehrsam v. Borgen, 185 Kan. 776,
347 P.2d 260 (1959) ; Stephan v. Proctor, 45 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1965) ; Johnson
v. Kolovos, 224 Or. 266, 355 P.2d 1115 (1960).
19 Illinois courts have applied the guest statute to an eight and fourteen
App. 555 (1935); Johnson v. Chicago &
year old. Farley v. Mitchell, 282 Ill.
N.W. Ry. Co., 9 Il1. App. 2d 340, 132 N.E.2d 678 (1956).
20 See note 11 supra.
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In analyzing the creation of a guest status, the court faced
the critical question of whether or not a child of tender years has

the mental capacity to accept that status"' or reject it by making
payment. 22 To answer this, the court first reiterated the doctrine
that general statutes may be construed to incorporate well-known
rules by law. 23 By applying this doctrine to the factual situations
of the cases at bar, it was held to be unnecessary to decide the
constitutionality of the guest statute 2 4 as to children of tender
years, for infants have repeatedly been exempted from civil and
21

Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Motor Vehicles §72.01 (Automobile

Guests) states:
A person is a guest [in a motor vehicle] when he is there at the invitation, either expressed or implied, of [the driver or operator] of the
vehicle and if he accepts the invitation without making or being expected
to make any payment therefore. (Emphasis added.)
22 See note 5 supra. "An important, if not decisive test, under the
statute is payment." Miller v. Miller, 395 Ill. 273, 287, 69 N.E.2d 878, 885
(1946).
23 Ragon v. Ragon, 45 Ill. 2d 25, 30, 257 N.E.2d 100 (1970), citing McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 285 Ill. 52, 120 N.E. 476 (1918). In McDonald, plaintiff, aged seven, was injured on city property and failed to give
notice of the injury complained of within the statutory six month period.
(Hurd's Stat. 1917, p. 1663). Defendant demurred to the complaint and the
court answered as follows:
Statutes general in their terms are frequently construed to contain
exceptions, when considered in connection with well known rules of law,
without the courts being subjected to the criticism of having entered the
legislative field. This is done upon the theory that statutes, though
general in their terms, have been enacted with the full recognition of
rules of law which have become well known and well established. From
time immemorial the status of a minor of tender years has been recognized in law to be different from that of one of more mature years. The
law recognizes that up to the age of seven years a child is incapable of
such conduct as will constitute contributory negligence, and our courts
have uniformly so stated the law in their instructions to juries. [citations] At common law an infant within seven years of age could not
be convicted on a criminal charge, as he was conclusively presumed not to
be capable of committing a crime, and between the ages of seven and
fourteen he was still presumed to be incapable; but between those ages
this presumption might be overcome by proof. These rules of law are
based upon the well-known fact of the incapacity of children of tender
years, and they are not held to the same accountability as are adults.
The recognition, by the law, of the status of infants, and of their exemption up to a certain age from liability under the law, is so well known
that it must be presumed that the legislature, in enacting such a statute
as the one under consideration, did not intend by the general language
used to include within its provisions a class of persons which the law has
universally recognized to be utterly devoid of responsibility.
McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 285 Ill. 52, 54, 120 N.E. 476, 477 (1918).
As supportive authority the court relied upon Murphy v. Village of Ft.
Edward, 213 N.Y. 397, 107 N.E. 716 (1915); Born v. City of Spokane, 27
Wash. 719, 68 P. 386 (1902) ; Erhardt v. City of Seattle, 33 Wash. 664, 74
P. 827 (1903).
24 The general constitutionality of the Illinois guest statute was attacked
in the case of Clarke v. Storchak, where its validity was upheld by the Supreme Court of Illinois as a permissible extension of the state police power.
384 Ill. 564, 52 N.E.2d 229 (1943), appeal dismissed, 322 U.S. 713 (1943).
Plaintiff attacked the statute as a violation of the due process clauses
of the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution in addition
to violating the state clause which prohibits the destruction of legal remedies
(Ill. Const. Art. II §§2, 19). It was held that the statute violated neither
constitutional provision and that the statute was a proper exercise of the
state police power.
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25
criminal actions because of their assumed mental incapacity,
and they similarly will be exempted from the guest statute.

A secondary issue to be decided was whether the actual or
implied consent of a parent could put a young child within the
guest status, as was contended by Raskin. The court held no,

that it could not, and stated that the consent theory is but "a
fiction which does not take account of the realities of the situation," 2 and that to so hold would impute the negligence of the
27
parent to the child, and this the court would not do.
CONCLUSION

The Illinois Supreme Court has thus exempted children under the age of seven from the effects of the guest statute by holding: (1) that they are incapable of assenting to a guest status,
and (2) that actual or implied parental consent is ineffective and
does not place the child within a guest status. In order to so
28
hold, it was necessary to liberally construe the Illinois statute.
The effect of this holding is likely to be widespread in the states
with statutes similar to Illinois. This is the first case exempting
infants as a matter of law, and the concept is sure to gain acceptance.
Decisions in many areas of the law frequently evidence a
departure from the letter of the law in order to do justice. The
exclusion of children of tender years from the confines of the
statutory language is but a similar departure. Such limitations
evidence judicial cognizance of the harsh and often unjust re-

sults of statutory fiat and demonstrate a desire to remedy these
inequities. While the supreme court should be heartily applauded
for its enlightened interpretation of the guest statute, the legis-

lature should be assiduously encouraged to seek a more realistic
approach to the problems of the host-guest relationship than is
to be found in the guest statutes currently in force.
John A. Dienner III
2'5Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45 Ill.
26 Id. at 31, 257 N.E.2d at 10.
27 Id. at 32, 257 N.E.2d at 10.
28 The Supreme Court reversed

2d at 30-31, 257 N.E.2d at 103(1970).

the appellate court's strict construction
of the statute in order to apply the "well known rules of law." See text at
note 22. The following jurisdictions liberally construe guest statutes:
Hardwick v. Bublitz, 253 Ia. 49, 111 N.W.2d 309 (1961) (to be literally
construed); Borstad v. LaRogue' 98 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1959) (same); Peterson v. Snell, 805 S.D. 496, 127 N.W.2d 142 (1964); Gregory v: Otts' 329
S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (liberally construed to effectuate purpose
of statute; strictly to determine rider's status). Contra: Baldwin v. Hill,
315 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1963); Rogers v. Lawrence, 227 Ark. 117; 296 S.W.2d
899 (1957) ; Hoffman v. Davis, 239 Ark. 99, 387 S.W.2d 338 (1965); GreenV.
Jones, 136 Colo. 512, 319 P.2d 1083 (1957) ; Serkes v. Parsekian, 78 N.J.
Super. 344, 179 A.2d 785 (1962); Naphtall v. Lafazan, 8 App. Div. 2d 22,
186 N.Y.S. 2d 1010 (1959); Economou v. Anderson, 4 Ohio App. 2d 1, 211
N.E.2d 82 (1965) ; Masone v. Ferino, 32 Misc. :2d 15, 221 N.Y.S.2d 1472
(N.Y. City. Ct 196.1) (Florida law) ;. Brown i.Gamble,.60 Wash. 2d 376, .4
P.2d 151 (1962).

"
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